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THE COURT OF APPEALS 1952-53 TERM
best serve the interests of the people of the State as well as its
civil service employees. Furthermore there still remain alternative measures to remedy any abuse in the immediate case. Granted
a total inadequacy of the qualifying examinations, this does not

mean per se that those appointees are unfit. While in a practical

sense not fully adequate, removal may be effected under the Civil

Service Law for incompetency or unfitness.

The proper precau-

tions should better lie in a close and punctual scrutiny of the

municipal commissions rather than jeopardizing the desirable
stability and security of the civil service system to remedy a past

neglect.
Muniipal Tort Liability
To bring a tort action against a municipal corporation, a
notice of claim must be served in person or by registered mail on
the proper municipal party within 90 days after the claim arises
as required by General Municipal Law § 50-e.22 Service of such
claim must strictly comply with the statutory requirements. 23 The
court in dealing with the exact statutory wording, delivered two
somewhat contradictory decisions.
In Teresta v. City of New York, 24 the city having been served
a notice of claim by ordinary mail, rather than registered mail,
notified claimant to appear for examination, examined claimant
and did not raise the issue of improper service until the trial
commenced. The Appellate Division had held 25 service was improper for lack of strict statutory compliance,26 but the Court of
Appeals reversed (5-2) on the ground that "present here, in addition to an unequivocal waiver, are elements of estoppel. ' 27 The
basis of the dissent by Judge Lewis was that of strict statutory
compliance. Subsequent to the litigated service, but prior to the
court's opinion, as noted in the majority opinion, 28 the Legislature
had amended § 50-e so as to validate service by ordinary mail
22. The purpose of such claim notice is to afford municipalities protection against
needless litigation, stale claims and possible connivance of corrupt officials. Brozw; v.

Bnard
(1952). of Trustees of Town of Hamptonburq, 303 N. Y. 484, 490, 104 N. E. 2d 866, 869
2.

Thomann v. City of Rochester, 256 N. Y. 165, 172, 176 N. E. 129, 131 (1931);

Matter of Merkle v. County of .Nrassan, 197 Misc. 560, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 673 (Sup. Ct.
1950).'
24. 304 N. Y. 440, 108 N. E. 2d 397 (1952).
25. Teresta v. City of New York, 277 App. Div. 787, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 335 (1st Dep't
1950).
26. One year later the 2d Dep't went directly contrary to, the 1st Dep't in the
Teresta case. Drake v. Comptrolier of City of New York, 278 App. Div. 317, 318-319,

104 N. Y. S. 2d 774 (2d Dep't 1951), per Justice Van Voorhis.
27. Teresta v.City of New York. supra note 24 at 433, 108 N. E. 2d at 398.
28. Id. at 442. 108 N E. 2d at 397.
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where the claimant had been examined. -9 Some eight months later
in M3unroe v. Booth 0 the court dealt with service of notice of claim
on the proper party for a school district.3 1 Here service was made
by the plaintiff's attorney in person on the clerk in charge of the
school district office, who had run and supervised the school's business for forty-two years. Following her usual office procedure the
clerk endorsed the notice and forwarded it to the school attorney.
The notice was prompt, and handled in the same way as if served
in any other manner. The Court of Appeals in a (5-2) per curiam
opinion, stated "desirable though relaxation of stahtory provisions relating to service may appear, to avoid a seemingly harsh
result, the courts may not disregard clear and explicit requirements imposed by the legislature" but that "it was in keeping with
that legislatively declared policy that we recently held sufficient
and proper the sending of a notice of claim by ordinary mail, even
though the statute prescribed that it be forwarded by a 'registered' letter. See Teresta v. City of New York . . . The legislature having spoken unequivocally, the court may not disregard its
pronouncement. . . ,,32 The dissenting opinion by Judge Froessel
argued that it was a question of fact as to whether
the party
83
actually served was an agent to the proper parties.
Where claimant is an infant, or is mentally or physically incapacitated and by reason of such disability fails to serve notice of
claim, or dies, within the 90 day limitation for such service, the
court at its discretion may grant leave to serve notice of claim on
application of claimant within one year of the time of the event
from which the claim
arose. 4 In Gehr v. Board of Education of
the City of YonJkers35 such an application was referred to a referee
who found that neither on the facts nor the law could it be held
that the claimant's failure to serve notice within 90 days was due
solely to her disability. The trial court found differently but deferred to the referee's findings. The Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court and the Appellate Division stated that the
N ciPAL LAW § 50-e subd. 3 as amended by L. 1951 c. 393.
30. 305 N. Y. 426, 113 N. E. 2d 546 (1953).

29. GENERAL "

31. C. P. A. § 228 (6) requires service on "any member of the board of education,
32. Munroe v. Booth, .supra note 30 at 428, 113 N. E. 2d at 547.
33. Factual point of consideration: In Teresta case, plaintiff, a laborer over 60

ioany trustee, or the clerk thereof."

years old personally inquired and mailed in the notice of the claim.
In the Munroe case notice of claim was served by plaintiff's attorney.
Legal point .of consideration not discussed in either case: the plaintiff in the
Tcresta case was injured in a city-owned street car, a proprietory interest where there is
no common law sovereign immunity, Drake v. Comptroller, supra note 26. In the
Munroe case a child was injured playing in a schoolyard, a governmental function enjoying sovereign immunity, Brown v. Board of Trustees, supra note 22,
34. GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW § 50-e subd. 5. See note, 1 Bxo. L. Rv.64 (1951).
for discussion as creating exception to C. P. A. § 60.
35. 304 N. Y. 436, 108 N. E. 2d 371 (1952).
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referee's report was not binding, but merely "to inform the conscience of the court."'
Home Rule
The New York Constitution expressly prohibits the Legislature from passing any law in relation to the "property, affairs or
government" of cities, except by general law which in terms and
effect apply alike to all cities or by special request of the particular
city.3 7 The purpose of these so-called home rule provisions is to
prevent special pork-barrel legislation and undue rural influence in
respect to cities.38 As to just what acts constitute such infringement upon the "property, affairs or government" of cities has
been a constant source of litigation. Adler v. Deegan?9 is the leading case in New York, stating that "property, affairs or government" are words of art, defined not by the common meaning of
the words, but as defined by the Court of Appeals. In 1953 the
Legislature authorized New York City to turn over its transit
facilities to the New York City Transit Authority if the city would
comply with certain conditions.40 Favorable tax provisions would
thereby accrue to New York City. A taxpayer's action was
brought in Salzma%v. Impellitteri4' to enjoin the city from this
legislatively authorized transaction and a declaratory judgment
was sought as to the constitutionality of the transaction. The Court
of Appeals held, per curiam, that "the statutes in question are
permissive only,42 in a field in which the State is concerned 3 . . .
and assuming that any transfer will not be by absolute conveyance,
but by a lease of limited term with reversion to the city,44 we cannot say that the legislation is on its face unconstitutional." Judge
Dye dissented on the ground that New York City's straightened
tax structure made any choice purely illusory, that the legislation
deals solely with a proprietory interest of New York City and is
thus in violation of the constitutional home-rule provisions.
36. The instant case citing Bannon v. Bannon, 270 N. Y. 484, 493, 1 N. E. 2d
975, 979 (1936).
37. NEw Yorx CoNsT. Art. IX, § 11.
38. 1 MCQUILLAN, MuNIciPA. CoRpoATrio_ § 1.93 (3d ed. 1949); FoRDHAm,
LocAL GovmRNMEN LAW 74-79 (Ist ed. 1949).
39. 251 N. Y. 467, 167 N. E. 705 (1929).
40. L. 1953, cc. 200-208.
41. 305 N. Y. 414, 113 N. E. 2d 543 (1953).
42. For analogous case of permissive federal legislation not impinging upon state
sovereignty see Massachusetts v. Mcllon, 262 U. S. 447 (199.-).
43.' Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N. Y. 377, 134 N. E. 187 (1922)
held that the New York City transportation system was a matter of state concern and
the legislature may therefore act under the police power.
44. N. Y. Const. Art. VIII, § 1 prohibits a city from giving or loaning its credit
to a public or private corporation. The transit authority would be a public corperation.
GEN. Coin. LAW §§ 2, 3. Deady v. Lyons, 39 App. Div. 139, 57 N. Y. Supp. 448 (4th
Dep't 1899) held that a village could not give funds for repair of a county courthouse
because this would be a gift to a public corporation.

